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Anewbandwidthallocationmodelisstudiedinthispaper.Inthismodel,asystem,suchasacommunicationnetwork,iscomposed
of a finite number of users, and they compete for limited bandwidth resources. Each user adopts the decision that maximizes his
or her own benefit characterized by the utility function. The decision space of each user is subject to constraints. In addition,
some users form a group, and their joint decision space is also subject to constraints. Under the assumption that each user’s utility
function satisfies some continuity and concavity conditions, the existence, uniqueness, and fairness, in some appropriate sense, of
the Nash equilibrium point in the allocation game are proved. An algorithm yielding a sequence converging to the equilibrium
point is proposed. Finally, a numerical example with detailed analysis is provided to illustrate the effectiveness of our work.
1. Introduction
With the widespread use of internet and the increasing
popularity of mobile devices, more and more people can
get online at almost anytime and anywhere. An immediate
challenge facing the significant increment of online users is
the support of quality of service (QoS). Over the past decade
considerable efforts have been made to ensure the smooth
operation of the networking systems. For example, the load
balancingproblemswereconsideredbyAnselmietal.[1]a nd
Ayestaetal.[2].TheroutingproblemswerestudiedbyLaand
Anantharam [3], Richman and Shimkin [4], Boulogne et al.
[5],andKorilisetal.[6–8].NiyatoandHossain[9]studiedthe
practical issue such as the admission control for the wireless
broadband standard. Ganesh et al. [10]a n dY a ¨ ıche et al. [11]
considered the pricing issues. In modeling the networking
problems, quite often the bandwidth availability is the main
concern and has its role in the associated performance
measure.Thenetworksystemquantifiestheresultscausedby
different operation scenarios and seeks the approach leading
to the greatest benefits in some sense. Since the benefit of
any network user inevitably involves that of other users, its
evaluationismostlycarriedoutinthecontextofgametheory.
In the survey paper Altman et al. collected a long list of
networking models based on game theoretic formulation.
Interested readers are referred to [12] and the rich reference
therein.
As mentioned above, the bandwidth availability is the
majorconcerninmanynetworkingproblems.Thebandwidth
allocation is thus the core issue as far as the quality of service
is concerned. While the bandwidth allocation problem was
consideredbymanyauthorsindifferentcontextsofnetwork-
ing protocols or communication standards (see e.g., [9, 11, 13,
14]),atahighlevelofabstractiontheproblemcanberegarded
as the classical resources distribution problem studied in
many professional fields such as economics, management
science, and operations research. Given a finite number of
unitscompetingforthelimitedresources,howdoeseachunit
decide its share based on its own utility function? Lazar et al.
[15] formulated this problem for the network composed of
noncooperative users. Under certain monotonicity, differen-
tiability, and convexity assumptions on the cost function the
unique existence and certain fairness property of the Nash
equilibriumpoint(NEP)wereproved.Analgorithmbasedon2 Journal of Applied Mathematics
Gauss-Seidel and Jacobi schemes was proposed and proved
to yield a sequence converging to the NEP. However, the
framework in [15] assumes only the natural constraint for
the bandwidth allocation. That is, the feasible bandwidth of
any user falls within the interval lower bounded by zero and
upper bounded by the bandwidth available for that user. In
practice some techniques such as the bandwidth throttling
and bandwidth/traffic shaping [16] are available to provide
more adaptive bandwidth control. To address this issue,
Rhee and Konstantopoulos [17, 18] relaxed the assumption
and allowed some prespecified numbers for the upper and
lower bounds of the bandwidth. This relaxation increases the
flexibilityofflowcontrolandhelpstheQoSsatisfactionbythe
networkingsystem.Ontheotherhand,inmodernbroadband
communication systems some users might form a group and
expect the group-wise QoS, in addition to the user-wise one.
For example, the customers of an internet service provider
(ISP) might include the individuals and a company with
many employees. To maintain the QoS, parameters would
be assigned to bound the bandwidth of each individual and
eachemployee.FurthermoretheISPandthecompanywould
set the constraint for the employee-averaged, or equivalently,
employee-totaled bandwidth, as shown in Figure 1.As i m i l a r
concept of group constraint can be seen in the cost-effective
broadbandaccessnetworksuchastheEthernet-basedpassive
optical network (EPON) [19, 20]. This system is composed
of an optical line terminal (OLT) and many optical network
u n i t s( O N U s ) .Th eO L Ti ss i t u a t e di nt h ec e n t r a lo ffi c ea n d
ONUs are distributed over the remote areas for multimedia
communication with the subscribers. In the upload process
each ONU adopts the time division multiplexing access
(TDMA) protocol to transmit data frames to the OLT, in the
sense that each ONU only transmits the data during the time
slots specifically scheduled for it [21]. The protocol avoids
the frame collisions between different ONUs at the cost of
i m p o s i n gt h eu p p e rb o u n df o rt h et i m e - a v e r a g efl o wo fe a c h
ONU and the upper bound for the total flow of all ONUs.
In light of the bandwidth sharing mechanism in EPON
and other similar systems, we extend the existing results to
include the user-grouping constraint for better model fitting.
S u p p o s ee a c hu s e rh a sh i so rh e ro w nu t i l i t yf u n c t i o nt h a t
describes the relation between the allocated bandwidth and
the resultant benefit to that user. Following the standard
assumptions, (1) the function depends on the bandwidth of
t h eu s e r ,a n do nt h eb a n d w i d t ho fo t h e ru s e r so n l yt h r o u g h
their total bandwidth, and (2) the function satisfies certain
continuity and concavity properties; we show the unique
existence and the fairness with some appropriate sense,
of the NEP in the allocation game. The contributions of
our work are twofold. First, a novel concept called user-
g r o u p i n gN E Pi sp r o p o s e d .Th i sc o n c e p ti sc o r r e s p o n d i n g
to the new introduction of the group constraint, under
which the uniqueness of NEP proved in [15, 17]n ol o n g e r
holds. Based on this concept we give a new definition for
the equilibrium point and prove its uniqueness under our
assumptions. The fairness of the allocation based on the
user-grouping NEP is also proved. Second, we show that the
Gauss-Seidel type algorithm in [15, 18]c a nb em o d i fi e dt o
yield a sequence converging to the user-grouping NEP. Since
Figure 1: The system bandwidth allocation r =( 𝑟 1,𝑟 2,...,𝑟 𝑛)
subject to user-wise constraints: 𝑟𝑖 ≤𝑟 𝑖 ≤ 𝑟
𝑖 for 𝑖∈{1,2,...,𝑛},a n d
a user-grouping constraint 𝑅𝑔 ≤∑
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑟𝑖 ≤ 𝑅𝑔.Th et o t a la l l o c a t i o n
𝑅=∑
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑟𝑖 is less than 𝑇, the total bandwidth.
the bandwidth allocation is of central concern in networking
systems, our results might result in the reinvestigation and
reformulation of other networking issues such that more
practical approaches can be developed.
2. Preliminaries
Suppose a networking system has 𝑛 users and they compete
for the system bandwidth. Each user is assigned with the
bandwidth subject to predecided upper and lower bounds.
In addition, 𝑚 of the 𝑛 users form a group and the total
bandwidth of the 𝑚 users is also subject to a predecided
constraint. We would like to design the system bandwidth
allocation policy that optimizes the performance index of
each user in the game-theoretical sense. For convenience, we
use the list of nomenclature shown at the end of the paper.
Assume the utility function for each user depends on
the bandwidth of that user and the total bandwidth of other
users. That is, the utility function for user 𝑖 in N can be
written as 𝑈𝑖(𝑟𝑖,𝑅). Also, assume the utility function satisfies
the following continuity and concavity properties [18].
Assumption 1. For each utility function 𝑈𝑖(𝑟𝑖,𝑅)
(a) 𝑈𝑖(𝑟𝑖,𝑅)is continuously differentiable with respect to
𝑟𝑖;
(b) (𝜕/𝜕𝑟𝑖)𝑈𝑖(𝑟𝑖,𝑅)isstrictlydecreasingwithrespect to 𝑟𝑖
and nonincreasing with respect to 𝑅.
Nowwedefinetheallocationfunction.Foruser𝑖inN\M
with the available bandwidth 𝑇𝑖, the allocation function 𝐴𝑖 is
defined as
𝐴𝑖 (𝑇𝑖)=arg max
𝑟𝑖≤𝑟≤𝑟𝑖
𝑈𝑖 ( 𝑟 ,𝑟+𝑇−𝑇 𝑖). (1)
For user 𝑖 in M with the available bandwidth 𝑇𝑖 and inside-
group information 𝑇
𝑔
𝑖 , the allocation function A𝑖 is defined
as
A𝑖 (𝑇𝑖,𝑇
𝑔
𝑖 )=arg max
𝑟𝑖≤𝑟≤𝑟𝑖,𝑅 𝑔≤𝑇
𝑔
𝑖 +𝑟≤𝑅𝑔
𝑈𝑖 ( 𝑟 ,𝑟+𝑇−𝑇 𝑖). (2)Journal of Applied Mathematics 3
Assumption 2. The bandwidth allocation with the constraint
parameters has the following properties:
(a) 𝑇𝑖 > A𝑖(𝑇𝑖,𝑇
𝑔
𝑖 ) for each feasible 𝑇𝑖 and 𝑇
𝑔
𝑖 where
𝑖∈M,a n d𝑇𝑖 >𝐴 𝑖(𝑇𝑖) for each feasible 𝑇𝑖 where
𝑖∈N \ M;
(b) ∑
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑟𝑖 > 𝑅𝑔 >𝑅 𝑔 > ∑
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑟𝑖.
Inourframework,theclassicalNashequilibriumpoint(NEP)
in the allocation game is defined as
r
∗ := (𝑟
∗
1,𝑟
∗
2,...,𝑟
∗
𝑛), (3)
where
𝑟
∗
𝑖 ∈ argmax
𝑟∈𝐶𝑖
𝑈𝑖 (𝑟,𝑟 + ∑
𝑗/ =𝑖
𝑟
∗
𝑗 ). (4)
Note that 𝐶𝑖 is {𝑟 | 𝑟𝑖 ≤𝑟≤𝑟𝑖,𝑅 𝑔 ≤𝑟+∑𝑗∈M\{𝑖} 𝑟
∗
𝑗 ≤ 𝑅𝑔} if
𝑖∈M and is {𝑟 | 𝑟𝑖 ≤𝑟≤𝑟𝑖} otherwise. The user-grouping
NEP is defined as
r
∗
𝑔 := (
𝑅
∗
𝑔
𝑚
,𝑟
∗
𝑚+1,𝑟
∗
𝑚+2,...,𝑟
∗
𝑛), (5)
where
𝑅
∗
𝑔 :=
𝑚
∑
𝑖=1
𝑟
∗
𝑖 . (6)
Remark 3. The definitions (3)-(4) reflect the central concept
of the well-studied constrained NEP. That is, given the
constrained strategy space 𝐶𝑖 for each user 𝑖∈N, 𝑟
∗
𝑖 is
d e fi n e da st h em a x i m i z e ro ft h eu t i l i t yf u n c t i o no fu s e r𝑖
provided that the strategy 𝑟
∗
𝑗 is adopted by user 𝑗 for each
𝑗∈N \{ 𝑖 } .N o t et h a tt h eb a n d w i d t ho fu s e r si nt h eg r o u p
M should satisfy the extra group constraint and thus 𝑟
∗
𝑖
might lose its uniqueness in 𝐶𝑖 as the group constraint is
active. The novel concept of user-grouping NEP in (5)-(6)i s
thusproposedto compensatethepropertyof theequilibrium
point.WewillshowinSection 3.1thatoursettingensuresthe
uniqueness of the user-grouping NEP.
Remark 4. Suppose 𝑇
∗
𝑖 := 𝑇 − ∑
𝑛
𝑗/ =𝑖𝑟
∗
𝑗 .A l s o ,l e t𝑇
𝑔∗
𝑖 := 𝑅𝑔 −
∑
𝑚
𝑗/ =𝑖𝑟
∗
𝑗 ,t h e n
𝑟
∗
𝑖 := {A𝑖 (𝑇
∗
𝑖 ,𝑇
𝑔∗
𝑖 ) if 𝑖∈M
𝐴𝑖 (𝑇
∗
𝑖 ) if 𝑖∈N \ M. (7)
By part (a) in Assumption 2 we have
𝑟
∗
𝑖 <𝑇
∗
𝑖 =𝑇−
𝑛
∑
𝑗/ =𝑖
𝑟
∗
𝑗 . (8)
Consequently,
𝑅
∗ :=
𝑛
∑
𝑖=1
𝑟
∗
𝑖 <𝑇 . (9)
ThismeansthattheNEP,orr
∗,satisfiesthenaturalconstraint
𝑅
∗ ≤𝑇 and the constraint is always inactive. Part (b) in
Assumption 2 is a natural condition such that the constraint
𝑅𝑔 ≤∑
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑟𝑖 ≤ 𝑅𝑔 makes sense.
The existence of the NEP in our setting is guaranteed by
Rosen’s result in the following.
Theorem5(see [22,Th eo r e m1 ] ) . An equilibrium point exists
for every concave 𝑛-person game.
Theorem 5 c a nb eo b t a i n e du s i n gt h ec l a s s i c a lK a k u t a n i
fixed point theorem and in some sense generalizes Nash’s
setting on the strategy space of the users [23, 24]. In the
next section we delve into other properties and propose an
a l g o r i t h mt ol o c a t et h eN E P .
3. Main Results
3.1. Uniqueness. Our first result is concerned with the
uniquenessoftheuser-groupingNEP.Thispropertyasshown
in [18, page 13] is not implied by the uniqueness theorem in
[22]. For the NEP r
∗ =( 𝑟
∗
1,𝑟
∗
2,...,𝑟
∗
𝑛) defined in (3)-(4),
theKarash-Kuhn-Tucker(KKT)conditionsmustbesatisfied.
Thatis,foreach𝑖∈N\MthereexistKKTmultipliers𝜆
∗
𝑖 and
𝜆
∗
𝑖 (see e.g., [25,p a g e4 5 8 ] )s u c ht h a t
−
𝜕
𝜕𝑟𝑖
𝑈𝑖 (𝑟
∗
𝑖 ,𝑅
∗)+𝜆
∗
𝑖 −𝜆
∗
𝑖 =0 , (10)
𝜆
∗
𝑖 (𝑟
∗
𝑖 − 𝑟𝑖)=0 , (11)
𝜆
∗
𝑖 (𝑟𝑖 −𝑟
∗
𝑖 )=0 , (12)
𝑟𝑖 ≤𝑟
∗
𝑖 ≤ 𝑟𝑖, (13)
𝜆
∗
𝑖 ≥0 , 𝜆
∗
𝑖 ≥0 . (14)
In addition, for each 𝑖∈M there exist KKT multipliers 𝜆
∗
𝑖
and 𝜆
∗
𝑖 satisfying (11)–(14), and 𝗾
∗
𝑖 and 𝗾
∗
𝑖 satisfying
−
𝜕
𝜕𝑟𝑖
𝑈𝑖 (𝑟
∗
𝑖 ,𝑅
∗) + 𝜆
∗
𝑖 −𝜆
∗
𝑖 + 𝗾
∗
𝑖 −𝗾
∗
𝑖 =0 , (15)
𝗾
∗
𝑖 (𝑅
∗
𝑔 − 𝑅𝑔)=0 , (16)
𝗾
∗
𝑖 (𝑅𝑔 −𝑅
∗
𝑔)=0 , (17)
𝑅𝑔 ≤𝑅
∗
𝑔 ≤ 𝑅𝑔, (18)
𝗾
∗
𝑖 ≥0 , 𝗾
∗
𝑖 ≥0 , (19)
where 𝑅
∗
𝑔 i sd e fi n e di n( 6).
Lemma6. For each 𝑖∈N\M,l e t𝑟
(1)
𝑖 := 𝐴𝑖(𝑇
(1)
𝑖 ) and 𝑟
(2)
𝑖 :=
𝐴𝑖(𝑇
(2)
𝑖 ) for some feasible 𝑇
(1)
𝑖 and 𝑇
(2)
𝑖 ,t h e n
𝑟
(1)
𝑖 >𝑟
(2)
𝑖 򳨐⇒ 𝜆
(1)
𝑖 −𝜆
(1)
𝑖 ≥ 𝜆
(2)
𝑖 −𝜆
(2)
𝑖 , (20)4 Journal of Applied Mathematics
where the nonnegative KKT multipliers 𝜆
(1)
𝑖 , 𝜆
(1)
𝑖 , 𝜆
(2)
𝑖 and 𝜆
(2)
𝑖
satisfy
𝜆
(1)
𝑖 (𝑟
(1)
𝑖 − 𝑟𝑖) =0 , 𝜆
(1)
𝑖 (𝑟𝑖 −𝑟
(1)
𝑖 ) =0 , (21)
𝜆
(2)
𝑖 (𝑟
(2)
𝑖 − 𝑟𝑖)=0 , 𝜆
(2)
𝑖 (𝑟𝑖 −𝑟
(2)
𝑖 )=0 . (22)
Proof. Since 𝑟
(1)
𝑖 and 𝑟
(2)
𝑖 are both feasible, 𝑟
(1)
𝑖 >𝑟
(2)
𝑖 implies
𝜆
(1)
𝑖 =0and 𝜆
(2)
𝑖 =0by (21)a n d( 22), respectively. Conse-
quently, the result follows since 𝜆
(1)
𝑖 ≥0and 𝜆
(2)
𝑖 ≥0 .
Theorem 7. The user-grouping NEP defined in (5) is unique.
Proof. Suppose r
(1) =( 𝑟
(1)
1 ,𝑟
(1)
2 ,...,𝑟
(1)
𝑛 ) and r
(2) =( 𝑟
(2)
1 ,𝑟
(2)
2 ,
...,𝑟
(2)
𝑛 ) are both the equilibrium points. Let 𝑅
(1) =∑
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑟
(1)
𝑖
and 𝑅
(2) = ∑
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑟
(2)
𝑖 .W ec a nt h u sw r i t ef o r𝑖∈N \ M that
−
𝜕
𝜕𝑟𝑖
𝑈𝑖 (𝑟
(1)
𝑖 ,𝑅
(1))+𝜆
(1)
𝑖 −𝜆
(1)
𝑖 =0 ,
−
𝜕
𝜕𝑟𝑖
𝑈𝑖 (𝑟
(2)
𝑖 ,𝑅
(2))+𝜆
(2)
𝑖 −𝜆
(2)
𝑖 =0 ,
(23)
where 𝜆
(1)
𝑖 , 𝜆
(1)
𝑖 , 𝜆
(2)
𝑖 , 𝜆
(2)
𝑖 are the associated KKT multipliers.
Assume that 𝑅
(1) >𝑅
(2). If there exists 𝑖∈N \ M such that
𝑟
(1)
𝑖 >𝑟
(2)
𝑖 ,b yLemma 6 and Assumption 1 we have
−
𝜕
𝜕𝑟𝑖
𝑈𝑖 (𝑟
(1)
𝑖 ,𝑅
(1))+𝜆
(1)
𝑖 −𝜆
(1)
𝑖
>−
𝜕
𝜕𝑟𝑖
𝑈𝑖 (𝑟
(2)
𝑖 ,𝑅
(2))+𝜆
(2)
𝑖 −𝜆
(2)
𝑖 ,
(24)
which is a contradiction. We thus have 𝑟
(1)
𝑖 ≤𝑟
(2)
𝑖 for 𝑖 in
N \ M. This implies 𝑅
(1)
𝑔 := ∑
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑟
(1)
𝑖 >∑
𝑚
𝑖=2 𝑟
(2)
𝑖 =𝑅
(2)
𝑔 .N o t e
that, for 𝑖∈M,
−
𝜕
𝜕𝑟𝑖
𝑈𝑖 (𝑟
(1)
𝑖 ,𝑅
(1))+𝜆
(1)
𝑖 −𝜆
(1)
𝑖 + 𝗾
(1)
𝑖 −𝗾
(1)
𝑖 =0 ,
−
𝜕
𝜕𝑟𝑖
𝑈𝑖 (𝑟
(2)
𝑖 ,𝑅
(2))+𝜆
(2)
𝑖 −𝜆
(2)
𝑖 + 𝗾
(2)
𝑖 −𝗾
(2)
𝑖 =0 .
(25)
With similar arguments in proving Lemma 6 we can show
that
𝑅
(1)
𝑔 >𝑅
(2)
𝑔 򳨐⇒ 𝗾
(1)
𝑖 −𝗾
(1)
𝑖 ≥ 𝗾
(2)
𝑖 −𝗾
(2)
𝑖 . (26)
If 𝑟
(1)
𝑖 >𝑟
(2)
𝑖 for some 𝑖∈M,w eh a v e
−
𝜕
𝜕𝑟𝑖
𝑈𝑖 (𝑟
(1)
𝑖 ,𝑅
(1))+𝜆
(1)
𝑖 −𝜆
(1)
𝑖 + 𝗾
(1)
𝑖 −𝗾
(1)
𝑖
>−
𝜕
𝜕𝑟𝑖
𝑈𝑖 (𝑟
(2)
𝑖 ,𝑅
(2))+𝜆
(2)
𝑖 −𝜆
(2)
𝑖 + 𝗾
(2)
𝑖 −𝗾
(2)
𝑖 ,
(27)
which is a contradiction. We thus have 𝑟
(𝑖)
𝑖 ≤𝑟
(2)
𝑖 for each
𝑖∈M and therefore 𝑅
(1)
𝑔 ≤𝑅
(2)
𝑔 , also a contradiction. With
analogous arguments we can show that assuming 𝑅
(1) <𝑅
(2)
also leads to a contradiction. Therefore 𝑅
(1) =𝑅
(2) and by
Lemma 6 𝑟
(1)
𝑖 =𝑟
(2)
𝑖 for 𝑖∈N \ M. This implies 𝑅
(1)
𝑔 =𝑅
(2)
𝑔 ;
therefore r
∗
𝑔 is unique.
3.2. Fairness. Ab a n d w i d t ha l l o c a t i o nr =( 𝑟 1,𝑟 2,...,𝑟 𝑛) is
said to be fair if for any feasible 𝑡1 and 𝑡2
A𝑖 (𝑡1,𝑡 2) ≥ A𝑗 (𝑡1,𝑡 2) 򳨐⇒ 𝑟 𝑖 ≥𝑟 𝑗, (28)
where 𝑖,𝑗 ∈ M, and for any feasible 𝑡
𝐴𝑖 (𝑡) ≥𝐴 𝑗 (𝑡) 򳨐⇒ 𝑟 𝑖 ≥𝑟 𝑗, (29)
where 𝑖,𝑗 ∈ N \ M. This definition suggests that a fair
allocation guarantees the user in greater need of bandwidth
actually obtains more bandwidth.
Theorem 8. The bandwidth allocation based on the NEP
defined in (3)-(4) is fair.
Proof. Suppose 𝑖∈M.L e t𝑟
(1)
𝑖 = A𝑖(𝑇
(1)
𝑖 ,𝑡) and 𝑟
(2)
𝑖 =
A𝑖(𝑇
(1)
𝑖 +Δ𝑇 , 𝑡+Δ𝑇 ) .W et h u sh a v e
−
𝜕
𝜕𝑟𝑖
𝑈𝑖 (𝑟
(1)
𝑖 ,𝑅
(1))+𝜆
(1)
𝑖 −𝜆
(1)
𝑖 + 𝗾
(1)
𝑖 −𝗾
(1)
𝑖 =0 ,
−
𝜕
𝜕𝑟𝑖
𝑈𝑖 (𝑟
(2)
𝑖 ,𝑅
(2))+𝜆
(2)
𝑖 −𝜆
(2)
𝑖 + 𝗾
(2)
𝑖 −𝗾
(2)
𝑖 =0 .
(30)
Assume 𝑟
(2)
𝑖 −Δ𝑇>𝑟
(1)
𝑖 , which implies 𝑟
(2)
𝑖 >𝑟
(1)
𝑖 and by
Lemma 6 𝜆
(2)
𝑖 −𝜆
(2)
𝑖 ≥ 𝜆
(1)
𝑖 −𝜆
(1)
𝑖 .A l s o ,
𝑅
(2) := 𝑟
(2)
𝑖 +𝑅
(2)
−𝑖 >𝑟
(1)
𝑖 +Δ𝑇+𝑅
(2)
−𝑖
=𝑟
(1)
𝑖 +𝑅
(1)
−𝑖 := 𝑅
(1).
(31)
Similarly,
𝑅
(2)
𝑔 := 𝑟
(2)
𝑖 +
𝑚
∑
𝑗/ =𝑖
𝑟
(2)
𝑗 >𝑟
(1)
𝑖 +Δ𝑇+
𝑚
∑
𝑗/ =𝑖
𝑟
(2)
𝑗
=𝑟
(1)
𝑖 +
𝑚
∑
𝑗/ =𝑖
𝑟
(1)
𝑗 := 𝑅
(1)
𝑔 .
(32)
Note that (32)i m p l i e s𝗾
(2)
𝑖 −𝗾
(2)
𝑖 ≥ 𝗾
(1)
𝑖 −𝗾
(1)
𝑖 .W et h e nh a v e
−
𝜕
𝜕𝑟𝑖
𝑈𝑖 (𝑟
(2)
𝑖 ,𝑟
(2)
𝑖 +𝑅
(2)
−𝑖 )+𝜆
(2)
𝑖 −𝜆
(2)
𝑖 + 𝗾
(2)
𝑖 −𝗾
(2)
𝑖
>−
𝜕
𝜕𝑟𝑖
𝑈𝑖 (𝑟
(1)
𝑖 ,𝑟
(1)
𝑖 +𝑅
(1)
−𝑖 )+𝜆
(1)
𝑖 −𝜆
(1)
𝑖 + 𝗾
(1)
𝑖 −𝗾
(1)
𝑖 ,
(33)
which is a contradiction. Therefore, 𝑟
(2)
𝑖 −Δ𝑇≤𝑟
(1)
𝑖 ,w h i c h
implies
𝑇
(1)
𝑖 +Δ𝑇−𝑟
(2)
𝑖 ≥𝑇
(1)
𝑖 −𝑟
(1)
𝑖 , (34)Journal of Applied Mathematics 5
namely,
𝑇
(1)
𝑖 +Δ𝑇− A𝑖 (𝑇
(1)
𝑖 +Δ𝑇 ,𝑡+Δ𝑇 ) ≥𝑇
(1)
𝑖 − A𝑖 (𝑇
(1)
𝑖 ,𝑡).
(35)
To show the allocation based on r
∗ is fair, consider first the
case that 𝑖,𝑗 ∈ M. By definition 𝑟
∗
𝑖 = A𝑖(𝑇
∗
𝑖 ,𝑇
𝑔∗
𝑖 ), 𝑟
∗
𝑗 :=
A𝑗(𝑇
∗
𝑗 ,𝑇
𝑔∗
𝑗 ) where 𝑇
∗
𝑖 , 𝑇
𝑔∗
𝑖 , 𝑇
∗
𝑗 and 𝑇
𝑔∗
𝑗 a r ea l lf e a s i b l e .W i t h
𝑅
∗ d e fi n e di n( 9)w eh a v e
𝑇−𝑅
∗ =𝑇
∗
𝑖 − A𝑖 (𝑇
∗
𝑖 ,𝑇
𝑔∗
𝑖 )=𝑇
∗
𝑗 − A𝑗 (𝑇
∗
𝑗 ,𝑇
𝑔∗
𝑖 ), (36)
which equals the remaining bandwidth of the system after
allocation. Given A𝑖(𝑇
∗
𝑖 ,𝑇
𝑔∗
𝑖 )>A𝑗(𝑇
∗
𝑖 ,𝑇
𝑔∗
𝑖 ),w eh a v e
𝑇
∗
𝑖 − A𝑗 (𝑇
∗
𝑖 ,𝑇
𝑔∗
𝑖 )>𝑇
∗
𝑖 − A𝑖 (𝑇
∗
𝑖 ,𝑇
𝑔∗
𝑖 )
=𝑇
∗
𝑗 − A𝑗 (𝑇
∗
𝑗 ,𝑇
𝑔∗
𝑗 ).
(37)
Note that
𝑇
∗
𝑖 −𝑇
∗
𝑗 =𝑇
𝑔∗
𝑖 −𝑇
𝑔∗
𝑗 =𝑟
∗
𝑖 −𝑟
∗
𝑗 := Δ𝑇
∗. (38)
Equations (35)a n d( 37) imply Δ𝑇
∗ >0 ;h e n c e𝑟
∗
𝑖 >𝑟
∗
𝑗 .Th e
case for 𝑖,𝑗 ∈ N \ M can be similarly proved and is thus
ignored (see [18, Theorem 2.3] for details).
3.3. Algorithm. In this section we analyze the scheme to
identifytheuser-groupingNashequilibriumpoint.W esayan
individual update is implemented on user 𝑖 if the bandwidth
of each user other than 𝑖 is fixed and the bandwidth of
user 𝑖 is updated to maximize his or her utility function. In
addition, we say a batch update occurs in the collection K
o fu s e r si ft h eb a n d w i d t ho fe a c hu s e rn o ti nK is fixed and
the individual update is sequentially implemented on each
user in K repeatedly till an equilibrium is reached. Here
K is either M or N \ M.I fK = M the batch update is
implementedassumingnogroupconstraint,namely,𝑅𝑔 =∞
and𝑅𝑔 =0 .Notethatthebatchupdateisguaranteedtoreach
an equilibrium (see [15]a n d[ 18,S e c t i o n2 . 4 ] ) .A sar e s u l t ,
suppose r
𝑘 =( 𝑟
𝑘
1,𝑟
𝑘
1,...,𝑟
𝑘
𝑛) is the system allocation at step
𝑘.I fa ni n d i v i d u a lu p d a t eo c c u r sa tu s e r𝑖∈N \ M at step
𝑘+1 ,t h a tm e a n s𝑟
𝑘+1
𝑗 =𝑟
𝑘
𝑗 for 𝑗∈N \{ 𝑖 } ,a n d
−
𝜕
𝜕𝑟𝑖
𝑈𝑖 (𝑟
𝑘+1
𝑖 ,𝑅
𝑘+1)+𝜆
𝑘+1
𝑖 −𝜆
𝑘+1
𝑖 =0 , (39)
forsomeKKTmultipliers𝜆
𝑘+1
𝑖 and𝜆
𝑘+1
𝑖 and𝑅
𝑘+1 = ∑
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝑟
𝑘+1
𝑖 .
Ifabatchupdateoccursatthegroupofusersatstep𝑘+1,tha t
means 𝑟
𝑘+1
𝑗 =𝑟
𝑘
𝑗 for each 𝑗∈N \ M,a n dw ec a nw r i t ef o r
each 𝑖∈M
−
𝜕
𝜕𝑟𝑖
𝑈𝑖 (𝑟
𝑘+1
𝑖 ,𝑅
𝑘+1)+𝜆
𝑘+1
𝑖 −𝜆
𝑘+1
𝑖 + 𝗾
𝑘+1
𝑖 −𝗾
𝑘+1
𝑖 =0 , (40)
where 𝜆
𝑘+1
𝑖 , 𝜆
𝑘+1
𝑖 , 𝗾
𝑘+1
𝑖 and 𝗾
𝑘+1
𝑖 are the associated KKT
multipliers. We now show that a repeated implementation of
sequential batch updates on users in M and users in N \ M,
asoutlineinAlgorithm 1,yieldsasequenceconvergingtothe
user-grouping NEP r
∗
𝑔 in (5). Define first the error measure
𝑒(r
𝑘
𝑔) between r
𝑘
𝑔 and r
∗
𝑔 as
𝑒(r
𝑘
𝑔) =
𝑛
∑
𝑖=𝑚+1
򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨𝑟
𝑘
𝑖 −𝑟
∗
𝑖
򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 +
򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨𝑅
𝑘
𝑔 −𝑅
∗
𝑔
򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 +
򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨𝑅
𝑘 −𝑅
∗򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨, (41)
where 𝑅
𝑘
𝑔 := ∑
𝑚
𝑖=1 𝑟
𝑘
𝑖 . 𝑅
∗
𝑔 and 𝑅
∗ are defined in (6)a n d( 9),
respectively.
Lemma 9. The error measure 𝑒(r
𝑘
𝑔) defined in (41) is nonin-
creasing, namely, 𝑒(r
𝑘+1
𝑔 )≤𝑒 ( r
𝑘
𝑔) for any positive integer 𝑘.
Proof. If at step 𝑘+1an individual update occurs at 𝑖∈
N \ M,( 39) is satisfied. Since (10) is also satisfied, we have
by Lemma 6 and part (b) in Assumption 1 that
𝑅
𝑘+1 ≥𝑅
∗ 򳨐⇒ 𝑟
𝑘+1
𝑖 ≤𝑟
∗
𝑖 ,
𝑅
𝑘+1 ≤𝑅
∗ 򳨐⇒ 𝑟
𝑘+1
𝑖 ≥𝑟
∗
𝑖 .
(42)
Under the assumption
𝑒(r
𝑘+1
𝑔 )−𝑒( r
𝑘
𝑔)=
򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨𝑟
𝑘+1
𝑖 −𝑟
∗򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 −
򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨𝑟
𝑘
𝑖 −𝑟
∗򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨
+
򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨𝑅
𝑘+1 −𝑅
∗򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 −
򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨𝑅
𝑘 −𝑅
∗򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨.
(43)
Suppose 𝑅
𝑘+1 ≥𝑅
∗.I f𝑅
𝑘 ≥𝑅
𝑘+1,t h e n
𝑒(r
𝑘+1
𝑔 )−𝑒( r
𝑘
𝑔)=−( 𝑟
𝑘+1
𝑖 −𝑟
∗)−
򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨𝑟
𝑘
𝑖 −𝑟
∗򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 +𝑅
𝑘+1 −𝑅
𝑘
򳨐⇒ { =0 if 𝑟
𝑘
𝑖 <𝑟
∗
𝑖
<0 o.w.
(44)
Since 𝑅
𝑘 <𝑅
𝑘+1 implies 𝑟
𝑘
𝑖 <𝑟
𝑘+1
𝑖 ,w eh a v e
𝑒(r
𝑘+1
𝑔 )−𝑒( r
𝑘
𝑔)=− 𝑟
𝑘+1
𝑖 +𝑟
𝑘
𝑖 +𝑅
𝑘+1 −𝑅
∗ −
򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨𝑅
𝑘 −𝑅
∗򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨
򳨐⇒ { =0 if 𝑅
𝑘 >𝑅
∗
<0 o.w.
(45)
Using similar arguments we can analyze the case for 𝑅
𝑘+1 <
𝑅
∗ and obtain also that 𝑒(r
𝑘+1
𝑔 )≤𝑒 ( r
𝑘
𝑔).I fa ts t e p𝑘+1ab a t c h
update occurs, (15)a n d( 40)h o l df o re a c h𝑖∈M.S u p p o s e
𝑅
𝑘+1 ≥𝑅
∗. If there exists an 𝑖∈M such that 𝑟
𝑘+1
𝑖 >𝑟
∗
𝑖 then
part (b) in Assumption 1 implies
𝗾
𝑘+1
𝑖 −𝗾
𝑘+1
𝑖 < 𝗾
∗
𝑖 −𝗾
∗
𝑖 ; (46)
thereforeby (26)𝑅
∗
𝑔 ≥𝑅
𝑘+1
𝑔 .I fnosuch𝑖exists,namely,𝑟
𝑘+1
𝑖 ≤
𝑟
∗ for each 𝑖∈M,t h e nn a t u r a l l y𝑅
𝑘+1
𝑔 ≤𝑅
∗
𝑔.As i m i l a rr e s u l t
can be derived for the case 𝑅
𝑘+1 ≤𝑅
∗.W et h e nh a v e
𝑅
𝑘+1 ≥𝑅
∗ 򳨐⇒ 𝑅
𝑘+1
𝑔 ≤𝑅
∗
𝑔, (47)
𝑅
𝑘+1 ≤𝑅
∗ 򳨐⇒ 𝑅
𝑘+1 ≥𝑅
∗
𝑔. (48)6 Journal of Applied Mathematics
Table 1: The parameters of 𝗼𝑖 for 𝑖∈N = {1,2,...,100}.
𝑖𝗼 𝑖
1–10 .6111 .7052 .0283 .5209 .2591 .5082 .9732 .8182 .8588 .8966
11–20 .2995 .8800 .2552 .1921 .1866 .8611 .4446 .3866 .8320 .2065
21–30 .8978 .4595 .1634 .2687 .5207 .7724 .3874 .0444 .9868 .5230
31–40 .8437 .8919 .6856 .5178 .4420 .3801 .0318 .2159 .0853 .7969
41–50 .4018 .0498 .3165 .8712 .9314 .4257 .8662 .4806 .9083 .2505
51–60 .5266 .2448 .8384 .5257 .3498 .2571 .1688 .5992 .8110 .8489
61–70 .8448 .2350 .5083 .6694 .0907 .5430 .2980 .3818 .5339 .4265
71–80 .2320 .0284 .0260 .2743 .6945 .3300 .7505 .7957 .0537 .0092
81–90 .7281 .6644 .5853 .9190 .1673 .9720 .2196 .0382 .7078 .2290
91–100 .3526 .7095 .5887 .1088 .6468 .7311 .8634 .0226 .5252 .1512
Now
𝑒(r
𝑘+1
𝑔 )−𝑒( r
𝑘
𝑔)=
򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨𝑅
𝑘+1
𝑔 −𝑅
∗
𝑔
򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 −
򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨𝑅
𝑘
𝑔 −𝑅
∗
𝑔
򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨
+
򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨𝑅
𝑘+1 −𝑅
∗򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 −
򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨𝑅
𝑘 −𝑅
∗򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨.
(49)
Assume 𝑅
𝑘+1 ≥𝑅
∗.I f𝑅
𝑘 ≥𝑅
𝑘+1 then
𝑒(r
𝑘+1
𝑔 )−𝑒( r
𝑘
𝑔)=−( 𝑅
𝑘+1
𝑔 −𝑅
∗
𝑔)−
򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨𝑅
𝑘
𝑔 −𝑅
∗
𝑔
򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 +𝑅
𝑘+1 −𝑅
𝑘
򳨐⇒ { =0 if 𝑅
𝑘
𝑔 <𝑅
∗
𝑔
<0 o.w.
(50)
If 𝑅
𝑘 <𝑅
𝑘+1, which is equivalent to 𝑅
𝑘
𝑔 <𝑅
𝑘+1
𝑔 ,t h e n
𝑒(r
𝑘+1
𝑔 )−𝑒( r
𝑘
𝑔)=− 𝑅
𝑘+1
𝑔 +𝑅
𝑘
𝑔 +𝑅
𝑘+1 −𝑅
∗ −
򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨𝑅
𝑘 −𝑅
∗򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨 򵄨
򳨐⇒ { =0 if 𝑅
𝑘 >𝑅
∗
<0 o.w.
(51)
Applyingsimilarargumentsagainwecananalyzethecasefor
𝑅
𝑘+1 <𝑅
∗ and obtain also that 𝑒(r
𝑘+1
𝑔 )≤𝑒 ( r
𝑘
𝑔).
Theorem10. Algorithm 1 yields a sequence {r
𝑘
𝑔}
∞
𝑘=1 converging
tor
∗
𝑔,theuser-groupingNEPofthebandwidthallocationgame.
Proof. In the light of Lemma 9, we only need to show that
for each positive integer 𝑘, r
𝑘
𝑔 / = r
∗
𝑔 implies the existence of a
finite integer 𝑘1 such that 𝑒(r
𝑘+𝑘1
𝑔 )<𝑒 ( r
𝑘
𝑔).S u p p o s ei ti sn o t
thecasethenthereexistssome𝑘suchthat𝑒(r
𝑘+𝑘2
𝑔 )=𝑒 ( r
𝑘
𝑔)for
any positive integer 𝑘2,w h e r er
𝑘
𝑔 / = r
∗
𝑔. Consider the update
scheme that, at step 𝑘+𝑖−𝑚for 𝑖∈N \ M,t h ei n d i v i d u a l
update occurs at user 𝑖,a n da ts t e p𝑘+𝑛+1−𝑚the batch
update takes place for users in M. Without loss of generality
we assume 𝑅
𝑘+𝑛+1−𝑚 ≥𝑅
∗,t h e n𝑅𝑔( 𝑘+𝑛+1−𝑚 )≤𝑅
∗
𝑔 by
(47). Since 𝑒(r
𝑘+𝑛+1−𝑚
𝑔 )=𝑒 ( r
𝑘+𝑛−𝑚
𝑔 ),( 50)t o g e t h e rw i t h( 51)
implies 𝑅
𝑘+𝑛−𝑚 ≥𝑅
∗;h e n c e𝑅
𝑘+𝑛−𝑚
𝑔 ≤𝑅
∗
𝑔.Th a ti s ,𝑅
⋅ −𝑅
∗
and 𝑅
⋅
𝑔 −𝑅
∗
𝑔 do not change their signs as the step number is
increasedfrom𝑘+𝑛−𝑚to 𝑘+𝑛+1−𝑚.M o r eo v er ,𝑅
𝑘+𝑛−𝑚 ≥
𝑅
∗ implies 𝑟
𝑘+𝑛−𝑚
𝑛 ≤𝑟
∗
𝑛.S i n c e𝑒(r
𝑘+𝑛+1−𝑚
𝑔 )=𝑒 ( r
𝑘+𝑖−𝑚−1
𝑔 ) for
𝑖∈N \ M,( 44)a n d( 45) together imply 𝑅
𝑘+𝑖−𝑚 ≥𝑅
∗ and
thus 𝑟
𝑘+𝑖−𝑚
𝑖 ≤𝑟
∗
𝑖 ,f o r𝑖∈N \ M.A sar e s u l t ,𝑟
𝑘+𝑛−𝑚
𝑖 ≤𝑟
∗
𝑖 for
𝑖∈N \ M.N o t et h a t𝑅
𝑘+𝑛−𝑚
𝑔 ≤𝑅
∗
𝑔 and
𝑅
𝑘+𝑛−𝑚 =𝑅
𝑘+𝑛−𝑚
𝑔 +
𝑛
∑
𝑖=𝑚+1
𝑟
𝑘+𝑛−𝑚
𝑖
≥𝑅
∗ =𝑅
∗
𝑔 +
𝑛
∑
𝑖=𝑚+1
𝑟
∗
𝑖 .
(52)
We conclude that 𝑅
𝑘+𝑛−𝑚
𝑔 =𝑅
∗
𝑔 and𝑟
𝑘+𝑛−𝑚
𝑖 =𝑟
∗
𝑖 for𝑖∈N\M,
namely, r
𝑘
𝑔 = r
∗
𝑔, a contradiction.
4. A Numerical Example
Consider a data communication network system with 100
u s e r s .S u p p o s e3 0o ft h e mf o r mag r o u p .W et h e nh a v eN =
{1,2,...,100} and M = {1,2,...,30}.Th ea d o p t e du t i l i t y
function is
𝑈𝑖 (𝑟𝑖,𝑅) =𝑟
𝗼𝑖
𝑖 (𝑇−𝑅 ), (53)
where the parameters 𝗼𝑖’s are listed in Table 1.N o t et h a t
the utility function, known as the generalized power function
[26], has the continuity and concavity properties required
by Assumption 1.I np a r t i c u l a r ,i tc a nb es h o w n[ 18, page 11]
easily that the maximizer
argmax
𝑟 𝑈𝑖 (𝑟,𝑅) =
𝗼𝑖
1+𝗼 𝑖
𝑇𝑖 <𝑇 𝑖, (54)
and thus part (a) in Assumption 2 is satisfied. Suppose the
total available bandwidth 𝑇 = 6000, and the upper and lower
bounds for total bandwidth allocated to the group is 𝑅𝑔 =
2000 and 𝑅𝑔 = 800, respectively. Assume that the individual
bandwidth constraint for each user in Table 2 is used. Clearly
these parameters satisfy the natural requirements of part
(b) in Assumption 2. Applying Algorithm 1 yields a dynamic
bandwidth allocationevolvingwith the implementationstep,
as shown in Figure 2.Th el e ftp a r to ft h efi g u r es h o w st h e
evolution of total bandwidth allocated to the group, which isJournal of Applied Mathematics 7
(P1) Initiate the algorithm with a feasible r𝑔 and set 𝑠=0 .
(P2) (if current step is 𝑘) Perform a batch update for users in M at step 𝑘+1
by assigning 𝑟
𝑘+1
𝑗 =𝑟
𝑘
𝑗 for all 𝑗∈N \ M,
to reach 𝑟
𝑘+1
𝑖 = A𝑖 (𝑇
𝑘+1
𝑖 ,𝑇
𝑔,𝑘+1
𝑖 ) for all 𝑖∈M.
(P3) (if current step is ̂ 𝑘) Perform an individual update at user 𝑖 in N \ M
by assigning 𝑟
̂ 𝑘+1
𝑗 =𝑟
̂ 𝑘
𝑗 for all 𝑗∈N \{ 𝑖 } ,
to reach 𝑟
̂ 𝑘+1
𝑖 =𝐴 𝑖(𝑇
̂ 𝑘
𝑖 ),a n dl e t̂ 𝑘=̂ 𝑘+1 .
Sequentially implement this whole procedure till each user in N \ M
is updated.
(P4) Repeat (P3) to complete a batch update at users in N \ M.
(P5) Set 𝑠=𝑠+1and record the current r𝑔 as R(𝑠).
If ‖R(𝑠) − R(𝑠 − 1)‖ <𝜀then stops, otherwise go to (P2).
A l g o r i t h m1 :Th es c h e m et ol o c a t et h eu s e r - g r o u p i n gN E P .
(a) (b)
Figure 2: The sequence generated by Algorithm 1 for the example.
composed of user 1, user 2, up to user 30. At the beginning
of the algorithm, an initial feasible bandwidth allocation is
a l l o c a t e dt oe a c hu s e ro ft h es y s t e m .F i xt h et o t a lb a n d w i d t h
a l l o c a t e dt ot h eu s e r sn o ti nt h eg r o u pa n dfi n dt h eo p t i m a l
total bandwidth 𝑅𝑔. In the example 𝑅𝑔 is 3950.3. Since this
value is greater than the upper bound 𝑅𝑔 = 2000. 𝑅𝑔 is
replaced with 𝑅𝑔.F i xt h i s𝑅𝑔 we have the total available
bandwidth 𝑇−𝑅 𝑔 = 6000 − 2000 = 4000 for users not
in the group. Based on this availability of the bandwidth we
can find the equilibrium point for users not in the group.
In the example we have, for instance, the bandwidth 𝑟70 =
50, 𝑟90 = 57.554,a n d𝑟100 = 38.0004.N o wfi xt h et o t a l
bandwidth of the users notin the group,and find the optimal
bandwidth 𝑅𝑔 again. In the example we obtain 𝑅𝑔 = 2115.8.
Since this value is greater than the upper bound 𝑅𝑔 = 2000,
𝑅𝑔 is replaced with 𝑅𝑔 again. Note that the current optimal
bandwidthallocationforeachuseroutsidethegroupisfound
basedontheconditionthatthetotalbandwidthforthegroup
is 𝑅𝑔.Th ec u r r e n t𝑅𝑔 and 𝑟𝑚+1,...,𝑟 𝑛 is thus the 𝑅
∗
𝑔 and
𝑟
∗
𝑚+1,...,𝑟
∗
𝑛 for the user-grouping NEP in (5).
5. Conclusion
Wehaveproposedanovelbandwidthallocationmodelbased
on game theory. The consideration of the user-grouping
c o n s t r a i n td i s t i n g u i s h e st h i sm o d e lf r o mt h ea b u n d a n to n e s8 Journal of Applied Mathematics
Table 2: The bandwidth constraint for each user.
User (𝑖) 1–10 11–20 21–30 31–70 71–90 91–100
Upper bound (𝑟𝑖)1 0 0 2 0 0 2 9 0 5 0 7 8 1 0 0
Lower bound (𝑟𝑖)1 0 2 0 3 0 5 1 0 2 2
concerningsimilarallocationissues.Supposeeachusercom-
petes for the system bandwidth resources and is granted with
a constrained decision space. In particular, some users are
u n i t e di no n eg r o u pa n dt h et o t a lb a n d w i d t ha l l o c a t e dt ot h e
groupisconstrainedaswell.Giventheappropriateconstraint
parametersandtheutilityfunctionsatisfyingmildcontinuity
and concavity conditions for each user, we have shown
the unique existence of the user-grouping Nash equilibrium
point for the allocation game. In addition, we have shown
the fairness, in a proper sense, of the allocation based on
t h i se q u i l i b r i u mp o i n t .F i n a l l y ,w eh a v ep r o p o s e da ni t e r a t i v e
algorithm and proved that a sequence converging to the
point can be generated by the algorithm. A practical example
illustratinganetworksatisfyingoursettingshasbeengivento
show how the equilibrium point can be located successfully.
Nomenclature
N: The index set for the users, that is,
N :={1,2,...,𝑛}
M: The index set for the users in the group,
that is, M :={1,2,...,𝑚}
N \ M: The index set for the users not in the
group, that is, N \ M :={𝑚,𝑚+1,...,𝑛}
𝑟𝑖: Th eb a n d w i d t ha l l o c a t e dt ou s e r𝑖
𝑟𝑖:L o w e r b o u n d f o r 𝑟𝑖
𝑟𝑖:U p p e r b o u n d f o r 𝑟𝑖
𝑅𝑔:T o t a l b a n d w i d t h a l l o c a t e d t o t h e g r o u p
members, that is, 𝑅𝑔 := 𝑟1 +𝑟 2 +⋅⋅⋅+𝑟 𝑚
𝑅𝑔:L o w e r b o u n d f o r 𝑅𝑔
𝑅𝑔:U p p e r b o u n d f o r 𝑅𝑔
𝑇: Total bandwidth available in the system
𝑅:T o t a l b a n d w i d t h a l l o c a t e d , t h a t i s ,
𝑅: =𝑟 1 +𝑟 2 +⋅⋅⋅+𝑟 𝑛
𝑅−𝑖:T o t a l b a n d w i d t h a l l o c a t e d , e x c l u d i n g t o
user 𝑖,t h a ti s ,𝑅−𝑖 := 𝑟1 +⋅⋅⋅+𝑟 𝑖−1 +𝑟 𝑖+1+
⋅⋅⋅+𝑟 𝑛
𝑇𝑖:T o t a l b a n d w i d t h a v a i l a b l e f o r u s e r 𝑖,t h a t
is, 𝑇𝑖 := 𝑇 − 𝑅−𝑖
𝑇
𝑔
𝑖 : Inside-group information for user 𝑖∈M,
that is, 𝑇
𝑔
𝑖 := 𝑅𝑔 −∑
𝑚
𝑗/ =𝑖𝑟𝑗.
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